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Abstract
We employ loan-level data on over a million loans disbursed in India between 1995
and 2010 to understand how fast-changing regulation impacted mortgage lending and
risk. Our methodology o¤ers an alternative to regression discontinuity analysis that
applies even when regulations create no discontinuities in the cross-section. We use
cross-sectional di¤erences in the time-series variation of delinquency rates, conditional
on initial interest rates, to detect the e¤ects of regulations favoring smaller loans. We
also nd that a change in the classication of non-performing assets reduced both
delinquency probabilities and losses given delinquency.
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1 Introduction
How does mortgage regulation inuence the structure and performance of housing nance?
This paper answers the question by analyzing administrative data on over 1.2 million loans
originated by an Indian mortgage provider, relating loan pricing and delinquency rates to
the changing details of Indian mortgage regulation.
A more common approach to this question is to compare mortgage systems across coun-
tries. Casual observation reveals striking cross-country di¤erences. A recent survey by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF 2011) shows that among developed countries, homeown-
ership rates range from 43% in Germany to about 80% in southern European countries. The
level of mortgage debt in relation to GDP varies from 22% in Italy to above 100% in Denmark
and the Netherlands. The terms of mortgage instruments are overwhelmingly adjustable-
rate in southern Europe, and xed-rate in the United States. Mortgages are funded using a
wide variety of mechanisms, including deposit-nanced lending, mortgage-backed securities,
and covered bonds.
Government involvement in mortgage markets also varies across countries, and it is likely
that this explains at least some of the cross-country variation in housing nance. However,
it is hard to disentangle regulatory e¤ects from other factors that may a¤ect household
mortgage choice across countries, including historical experiences with interest rate and
ination volatility, which can have long-lasting e¤ects because consumers can be slow to
adopt new nancial instruments (Campbell 2012).
An appealing alternative approach is to trace the e¤ects of mortgage regulation over
time within a single country rather than rely entirely on cross-country evidence that can be
contaminated by unobserved di¤erences across countries. The di¢ culty in doing this is that
developed countries tend to have fairly stable systems of nancial regulation, so one rarely
has the opportunity to track the e¤ects of sharp regulatory changes. Slow changes, such
as those that occurred in the US during the early and mid-2000s, may well be important
but it is hard to show this convincingly. For this reason academic writers and public policy
commentators have reached no consensus on the degree to which regulation, rather than
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other factors, caused the US mortgage credit boom.1
Mortgages are rapidly becoming important nancial instruments in emerging markets.
Here, nancial regulation is at least as intrusive and much less stable. In addition, long-
lasting historical inuences are likely to be less important in emerging markets because their
rapid growth and nancial evolution reduce consumer inertia. For this reason, emerging
markets are ideal laboratories in which to examine the e¤ects of mortgage regulation.
This paper studies the mortgage market in India, a large and complex emerging economy.
India has been studied extensively by the economics profession, which has mainly analyzed
issues of poverty and development (see, for example, Besley and Burgess, 2000, and Banerjee
et al., 2007), or the impact of the Byzantine system of laws and regulations on industrial
organization and rm output (see Aghion et al., 2008, and von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee,
and Visaria, 2012 for example). India underwent an economic liberalization in the early
1990s and subsequently experienced rapid economic growth that accelerated further in the
2000s. During this time the nancial sector has become much larger and more sophisticated,
but remains highly regulated, with a signicantly nationalized banking sector.
It is only very recently that authors such as Anagol and Kim (2012) have begun to
study India in the context of nancial regulation and its impacts on fast-changing Indian
capital markets. The provision of housing nance is evolving particularly rapidly (Tiwari
and Debata 2008, Verma 2012). Regulatory norms have changed frequently, albeit with
a continuing emphasis on funding housing for low-income households. There is increased
competition between mortgage lenders, and this may have contributed to rapidly increasing
house prices since 2002. Indian mortgages include both xed and variable rate loans, but
there has been a signicant shift over time towards the latter.
The challenge in emerging markets, India included, is to nd adequate data. Many
questions about mortgage nance can only be answered using microeconomic data, either at
1A range of views can be found in Acharya, Richardson, van Nieuwerburgh, and White (2011), Baily
(2011), Ellis (2008), International Monetary Fund (2011), and US Treasury and Department of Housing and
Urban Development (2011), among other sources. Dahl, Evano¤, and Spivey (2000), Kroszner (2008), and
Agarwal, Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2012) debate the importance of the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) in encouraging risky lending to lower-income borrowers.
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the household level or the loan level. There is now a vast literature looking at such data
in the US, but it is harder to nd in less wealthy countries with rapidly changing nancial
systems.2 We are fortunate to have access to loan-level administrative data from an Indian
mortgage provider. We analyze over 1.2 million mortgages disbursed by the mortgage
provider between 1995 and 2010, and attempt to understand the determinants of mortgage
rate setting and delinquencies.
Our ability to use microeconomic data is important because pure time-series variation
in mortgage risk, even if correlated with changing regulation, may also be explained by the
changing state of the macroeconomy. Instead, we measure cross-sectional variation in the
time-series movements of mortgage delinquency, and link this cross-sectional variation to the
incentives created by regulations. One widely used implementation of this approach uses a
regression discontinuity design, seeking to identify a discontinuous change in behavior around
a threshold created by regulation. However this approach confronts numerous challenges, the
most obvious being when regulations do not have clearly identiable points of discontinuity.
Even when regulatory discontinuities do exist, they may alter the incentives and behaviors
of market participants in a manner that blurs identication near regulatory boundaries.
Both of these issues arise in the Indian context, leading us to pursue an alternate approach.
Specically, we link time-variation in regulatory incentives to cross-sectional variation in
their expected impacts on di¤erent types of mortgages, as well as to geographical variation
across local o¢ ces operated by the mortgage provider.
Our approach yields two main ndings on the relation between regulation and mortgage
risk. First, throughout the period of study, small and micro loans are particularly favoured
by the Indian regulatory environment. We uncover evidence that the implicit subsidies to
such loans show up in a higher propensity for them to default than can be accounted for by
their mortgage rates at issuance and all other determinants in the model. This tendency
is highly statistically signicant, is greater for micro loans than for small loans marginally
2Some recent mortgage studies using US microeconomic data include Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009),
Agarwal et al (2011), Amromin et al (2011), Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan (2010), Demyanyk and van Hemert
(2011), Foote et al (2010), Johnson and Li (2011), Keys et al (2010), Melzer (2011), Mian and Su (2009),
and Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2011).
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under the subsidy-qualifying threshold, and is observed in all cohorts of loan issuance over
the sample period.
The obvious approach of looking for a discontinuity in the delinquency rate at the subsidy-
qualifying threshold is complicated by the responses of higher-income home-buyers, who have
incentives to benet from subsidies by taking out small loans just underneath the qualifying
threshold. To the extent that such loans are safer than other loans of similar size, these
actions would result in a blurring of the otherwise expected discontinuity in delinquency
rates observed on either side of the threshold.
We therefore adopt our alternative approach, and relate the magnitude of the excess
delinquency propensity of small and micro loans to time-series variation in the tightness
of the constraint favoring these loans. The regulator only periodically adjusts the nominal
subsidy-qualifying threshold, while nominal house prices (which determine the nominal sizes
of loans demanded) have increased over time. This means that the share of unqualied
loans, a proxy for the tightness of the constraint on the mortgage provider to make qualifying
loans, varies over time. We nd that the excess delinquency propensity of small and micro
loans covaries signicantly with this measure of constraint tightness, providing evidence that
regulation a¤ects mortgage risk. We also document that there is important geographical
variation in delinquency rates, which operates in a fashion consistent with a strategic response
of the mortgage provider to the regulatory incentives which it faces.
The second important change that we track in the Indian regulatory environment occurs
in March 2004. At this point, the regulatory denition of non-performing assets,changes
from previously referring to loans that are six-months delinquent to those that are three-
months delinquent. Since provisioning requirements against delinquencies are tied to this
denition, we expect that this change creates incentives for the mortgage provider to monitor
loans earlier, and potentially to improve loan screening. Although the regulatory change
is itself discrete, it is not clear at what point in the life of a delinquent loan it will trigger
action by our mortgage provider, so once again a straightforward regression discontinuity
design is not feasible.
To investigate, we track loans as soon as they are agged as delinquent, which is when
4
they are one month behind on payments. Following the regulatory change, we nd that
these one-month delinquent loans are far less likely to subsequently become three-months
delinquent. Furthermore, using a subsample of 10,000 loans for which we have a complete
time series of payment histories, we uncover evidence that is consistent with greater e¤ort
on the part of the mortgage provider to monitor delinquencies in response to this regulatory
change. In particular, we nd that debt collection rates on one-month delinquent loans are
accelerated in the interval before they hit the new three-month mark for classication as a
non-performing asset. Importantly, perhaps as a result of incentivizing mortgage lenders to
act early on delinquent loans, we nd that this change substantially lowers the likelihood of
experiencing longer-term defaults. This impact on long-term defaults is even larger than
that arising from a 2002 legal change in the ability of mortgage providers to more easily
repossess or restructure non-performing assets. Moreover, we identify that the primary
impact of the regulation is on improved ex-post monitoring rather than on better ex-ante
screening.
Taken together, these two ndings provide compelling evidence that regulatory norms
impact the risk of delinquencies experienced by our Indian mortgage provider on loans is-
sued. Our evidence complements recent ndings using U.S. data on the impacts of regulatory
norms on mortgage screening (Keys et al. 2011), and is also related to work on how mortgage
credit expansion in the U.S., particularly in sub-prime zipcodes, contributed to the recent
crisis (Mian and Su 2009). Our evidence on the role played by subsidies in the increased
delinquency rates on small loans contributes to the debate on whether such subsidies in
other countries, such as the U.S. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), had similar e¤ects
(see, for example, Dahl, Evano¤, and Spivey 2000, Kroszner 2008, and Agarwal, Benmelech,
Bergman, and Seru 2012). Finally, our model shows that controlling for a range of determi-
nants of mortgage risk, the time when a loan is issued has signicant explanatory power, a
nding related to the analysis of Demyanyk and van Hemert (2011) who perform a similar
analysis to explain U.S. sub-prime mortgage risk.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by describing the
Indian macroeconomic environment and the Indian system of mortgage regulation during
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the quarter century since 1985, together with the mortgage data we employ. Further details
of Indian mortgage regulation are provided in an online regulatory appendix (Campbell,
Ramadorai, and Balasubramaniam 2012). Section 3 introduces our model of mortgage
delinquencies, which we use to explore the e¤ects of regulation specically, implicit subsi-
dies to small and micro loans and risk weights on high loan-value mortgages on the relative
delinquency rates of di¤erent types of loans. Section 4 discusses the change in the regulatory
denition of non-performing assets in 2004 and its consequences for observed delinquency
and repayment patterns. Section 5 concludes. Additional empirical evidence on the Indian
mortgage market is reported in an online empirical appendix (Campbell, Ramadorai, and
Ranish 2013).
2 The Macroeconomic and Regulatory Environment
2.1 Macroeconomic Trends
To set the stage, Table 1 summarizes the history of several important Indian macroeconomic
variables over the quarter-century from 19852010, including annual real GDP growth, CPI
ination, and government bond yields. Regulatory and macroeconomic reform in the early
1990s was followed by growth in the 4-8% range until the early 2000s, when growth acceler-
ated above 8%, briey slowed again only by the global nancial crisis in 2008. Meanwhile
ination was high and volatile during the 1990s, with volatility particularly elevated around
the reform period and in 199899. A period of more stable ination followed in the 2000s,
but ination accelerated at the very end of our sample period.
Indian government bond yields over the same period are also quite volatile. The 1-year
yield declines from double-digit levels in the mid-1990s, with a brief reversal in the late 1990s
related to the volatile ination experienced at the same time. After a low of about 5% in
the early 2000s, the 1-year yield spikes up to almost 8% in 2008, again related to concerns
about ination. The 10-year yield is smoother but also undergoes a large decline from the
mid-1990s until the early 2000s.
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Figure 1 plots real house price indexes, both for India as a whole and for ve broad
regions. The real rate of house price appreciation for the country as a whole is also reported
in Table 1. We compute these indexes using the mortgage providers own property cost data,
but data from the National Housing Bank (NHB) show similar patterns. Indian house prices
were relatively stable until the early 2000s and then began to increase rapidly, particularly in
the south of the country. The southern index peaks in 2008 while some other regions peak
in 2009. Thus India took part in the worldwide housing boom despite many di¤erences in
other aspects of its macroeconomic performance.
These house price movements are important for our study because they interact with
government policies favoring smaller loans. As house prices increase, fewer loans naturally
qualify for favorable regulatory treatment, creating time-series variation in the tightness of
regulatory constraints on mortgage lending. Understanding this e¤ect requires a detailed
explanation of the Indian regulatory system, which we now provide.
2.2 The Regulatory Environment
Mortgages in India are originated by two types of nancial institutions, banks and housing
nance companies (HFCs). Banks are regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), while
housing nance companies are regulated by the National Housing Bank (NHB), but most
regulations apply in fairly similar form to the two types of institution. This fact is important
for our study, as we are unable to publicly identify whether our mortgage provider is a bank
or an HFC.
Figure 2 summarizes the details of mortgage regulation in India in a relatively parsimo-
nious fashion. The top half of the gure shows regulations that applied to banks, and the
bottom half to HFCs. The regulations that remained constant throughout the period are
listed in Roman font, whereas the ones that changed over the period are in italic font. In
light of the signicant changes that took place from 2001 to 2002, we separate the timeline
into the rst period,i.e. prior to March 2001, and the second periodwhich extends from
April 2001 until the end of the sample period. In the middle of the gure, we summarize
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subsidy schemes for micro-lending with the length of the bars accompanying these schemes
identifying their start and end dates relative to the timeline.
Regulations can be divided into two types: those that restrict the funding of mortgage
lending, and those that incentivize lending to favored borrowers. Until 2001, mortgage
funding was regulated in a fairly traditional manner, using leverage restrictions on banks
and HFCs, and interest-rate ceilings on deposit-taking HFCs. From 2002 onwards, these
measures were augmented by capital requirements against risk-weighted assets following the
internationally standard Basel II framework. The RBI and NHB distinguished small and
large loans, and loan-value (LTV) ratios above and below 75%, and set di¤erent risk weights
for these di¤erent categories with frequent changes for loans below 75% LTV. In this way
the regulators shifted the risk capital available to banks and HFCs, and the incentives for
aggressive mortgage origination.
Another noteworthy change in the regulatory environment is highlighted on the timeline,
and occurred on March 31, 2004 for banks, and one year later, i.e., March 31, 2005 for HFCs.
At this time the RBI redened an asset as a non-performing asset(or NPA) if payments
(on interest or principal) remained overdue for a period of ninety days or more, from the
previous 180 day period allowed before assets were so classied. One important implication
of the classication of an asset as an NPA is that it incurs provisioning requirements, meaning
that the capital available to a mortgage lender holding such an asset reduces as the lender
is required to hold precautionary capital to cover expected losses.
Related to this NPA redenition, an important law which came into force somewhat
earlier (in July 2002), was the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act. This law enabled the easier recovery
of NPAs via securitization, reconstruction, or direct repossession, bypassing the need for
secured creditors to seek permission from debt recovery tribunals (see von Lilienfeld-Toal,
Mookherjee, and Visaria, 2012, for evidence of the impacts of the establishment of these
tribunals in 1993). In our analysis, we separately evaluate the impact of these two changes,
namely the redenition of NPAs in 2004, and the introduction of SARFAESI in 2002, on
delinquencies experienced by the mortgage provider.
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Lending to small borrowers is an important political goal in India. Banks are subject to a
quantity target for Priority-Sector Lending (PSL), which includes loans to agriculture, small
businesses, export credit, a¢ rmative action lending, educational loans, and of particular
interest to us mortgages for low-cost housing. The PSL target is 40% of net bank credit for
domestic banks (32% for foreign banks), and there is a severe nancial penalty for failure to
meet the target, namely, compulsory lending to rural agriculture at a haircut to the repo rate.
This regulation does not directly apply to HFCs, but bank lending to an HFC qualies for
the PSL target to the extent that the HFC makes mortgage loans that qualify, i.e., are below
the specied nominal PSL threshold. The overall e¤ect of the PSL system is to provide
an incentive, directly for banks, and indirectly for HFCs, to originate small mortgages that
nance low-cost housing purchases.
In addition to the PSL system, other schemes have been introduced at various points in
time over the sample period to subsidize new or renanced micro-lending i.e., loans of sizes
well below the PSL-qualifying threshold. The mid-section of Figure 2 shows the various
schemes that were in place to incentivize mortgage lending in very small loan sizes. These
schemes apply to both banks and HFCs. Most recently, interest rate subventions have been
put in place for the rst year of repayments on small loans, payments that are passed through
to the borrower in the form of a reduced interest rate, for housing loans up to a maximum
size. Special subsidy and renancing schemes in place for very small rural loans (the Golden
Jubilee Rural Housing Finance Scheme or GJRHFS, and the Indira Awas Yojana) and for
borrowers qualifying for a¢ rmative action (the Di¤erential Rate of Interest scheme) are also
shown in the gure, over the period for which they applied. Taken together, these schemes
increase the subsidy for tiny loans over and above the standard subsidy to PSL-qualifying
loans.
As is evident from the brief description above, it is not a trivial task to document the
changes in the system of Indian mortgage regulation as these have been frequent, and are not
summarized in any one place. The online regulatory appendix, Campbell, Ramadorai, and
Balasubramaniam (2012), provides further details about the regulatory system, and serves
as a comprehensive guide to Indian mortgage regulation over the period of our study.
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2.3 Evolution of the Mortgage Market
Both macroeconomic and regulatory forces have contributed to rapid change in the Indian
mortgage market. Table 2 illustrates the changes in three relevant characteristics of mort-
gages issued by our lender: the shares of variable-rate mortgages, small PSL-qualifying loans,
and mortgages with high loan-cost ratios above 75%.
The rst two columns of Table 2, Panel A show the variable-rate share in the number
and value of mortgages disbursed. There has been a dramatic shift in the Indian mortgage
system away from xed-rate and towards variable-rate mortgages, with one brief interruption
in 2004. Our lender made very few xed-rate mortgages after 2007. During the period
of transition through 2002, variable-rate mortgages were somewhat larger on average than
xed-rate mortgages, as shown by their higher share of value in the second column of the
table.
The next two columns of Panel A show the share of mortgages that are below the PSL
threshold, separately for variable-rate and xed-rate mortgages. The share below the PSL
threshold peaks in 2001 (for variable-rate mortgages) and 2000 (for xed-rate mortgages),
and then declines precipitously during the 2000s. The PSL-qualifying share is somewhat
higher for xed-rate mortgages, reecting their smaller average size.
The nal two columns of Panel A show the share of mortgages with loan-cost ratio above
75%, again separately for variable-rate and xed-rate mortgages. We use the loan-cost ratio,
available in the data from our mortgage provider, as a proxy for the loan-value ratio, the
subject of Indian mortgage regulation. Cost is equal to value plus any administrative or legal
fees incurred to purchase the property. The share of mortgages with loan-cost ratio above
75% trends upwards, increasing particularly rapidly in the early 2000s (for variable-rate
mortgages) and late 1990s (for xed-rate mortgages).
Both these trends are driven in part by the increase in house prices during the mid-1990s
and mid-2000s, shown earlier in Table 1 and Figure 1. Figure 3 illustrates this point in
a di¤erent way. The solid line in the gure is the unqualied lending share, the fraction
of mortgages disbursed that are above the PSL threshold and thus do not qualify for the
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PSL target. This fraction rises as house prices increase, particularly in the mid-1990s and
mid-2000s, but falls discontinuously when the PSL threshold is adjusted. Later in the paper,
we use the unqualied lending share as a proxy for the tightness of the regulatory constraint
favoring small loans.
Figure 3 also reports the intensity of regulatory preference for loans with loan-value ratio
below 75%. This is measured as the di¤erence in risk weights for loans above and below the
75% loan-value threshold. It is zero until January 2002, when it rises rapidly to a maximum
of 0.5 by the middle of 2003.
Our data display not only time-series variation in the fractions of loans below the PSL
threshold and above 75% loan-cost ratio, but also geographical variation, which arises nat-
urally from variation in local housing market conditions. Panel B of Table 2 reports the
cross-sectional mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum fractions of PSL-qualied
and high loan-cost mortgages, calculated across local o¢ ces of our mortgage lender. The
cross-sectional (across local o¢ ces) standard deviations are 19% for PSL-qualied loans and
11% for high loan-cost mortgages. In the empirical work of the next section we exploit
this variation to try to detect geographical variation in the mortgage lenders responses to
regulatory pressures.
Table 3 presents more details on cohorts of loans issued in each year. Panel A reports
cross-sectional cohort means of mortgage terms and delinquency rates. Initial interest rates
on variable-rate and xed-rate mortgages track one another very closely until 2002, and are
both close to the Indian prime rate shown in Table 1, despite some variation in the spread
between long-term and short-term government yields. In the period 200306, the variable
mortgage rate is well above the xed rate and has an unusually high spread over the 1-year
bond yield, a feature shared with the Indian prime rate. This period has a generally high
market share for variable mortgages, but does include an episode in 2004 when our mortgage
lender shifted back towards xed mortgage issuance. Variable mortgage rates decline after
2008, a period where our lender made few xed-rate mortgages.
Panel A also summarizes cohort means of loan maturity, loan-cost ratios, and loan-
income ratios. The previously discussed increase in loan-cost ratios is visible here too,
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but loan maturity and loan-income ratios are much more stable. This pattern contrasts
with mortgage trends during the 2000s in the US, where loan-income ratios increased while
loan-value ratios were relatively stable (Campbell and Cocco 2012).
The right-hand column reports the cohort 90-day delinquency rate, the annual probability
that an outstanding and not-yet-delinquent loan experiences a 90-day delinquency, calculated
separately for each disbursal-year cohort and calendar year, and then averaged over calendar
years for each cohort. The early 2000s appear unusual in the sense that the cohort default
rate for mortgages disbursed in these years is high relative to the other cohorts in the sample
period, despite loan characteristics such as loan-cost and loan-income ratios not changing
much on average. The 2004 xed-rate cohort, however, appears to have a signicantly
reduced default rate.
Figure 4 summarizes the history of Indian mortgage delinquency in a simpler way. It
plots the overall delinquency rate (the fraction of all outstanding mortgages, regardless of
the date of issue, that are 90 days past due), seasonally adjusted using a regression on
monthly dummies, for both xed-rate mortgages (solid line) and variable-rate mortgages
(dashed line). The main feature of this gure is the large spike in delinquencies in 200203,
particularly for xed-rate mortgages. Delinquencies decline to quite low levels by 2005, and
remain low to the end of our sample period despite the weak housing market in 200910.
Panel B of Table 3 shows the cross-sectional standard deviation of loan characteristics
and initial interest rates. In the early 2000s there is a large spike in the cross-sectional
dispersion of variable mortgage rates. This spike coincides with the period of increased
delinquencies documented earlier, and may reect increased e¤orts by our mortgage lender
to distinguish among borrowers by estimating their default risk and setting mortgage rates
accordingly. For xed mortgage rates, while the same pattern is not evident in the cross-
sectional dispersion of initial interest rates, there does seem to be an increase in the early
2000s in the cross-sectional dispersion of loan-cost ratios, which reduces again in 2004.
In the remainder of this paper, we explore in more detail the relation between mortgage
regulation and these movements in mortgage delinquencies.
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3 A Model of Mortgage Delinquencies
In this section we attempt to shed light on the factors which contributed to changes in
the mortgage delinquency rate over time and across cohorts, paying special attention to
the changing regulations described in the previous section. In order to do so, we propose
and estimate a model of mortgage delinquencies, recognizing that their determinants include
demographic characteristics of borrowers, measurable characteristics of loans, cohort-specic
variation, and (imperfectly observable) variation in macroeconomic conditions.
In our baseline specication, we model the probability of observing a delinquency as a
function of all of these determinants:
Pr[i;c;b;r;t] = (+ r + c + b + krkLikt + jjDijt + rri)Zr;t 1 + ei;t; (1)
where i;c;b;r;t is an indicator for an observed 90-day delinquency in loan i with interest-rate
type r (xed or variable) in cohort c originated in branch b, at time t. That is, c denotes
the loan origination date and t denotes the observation date. The model includes xed
e¤ects for each interest rate type, r, branch b, and cohorts, c. In each case, we drop one
dummy as we have an intercept in the model. The model also includes loan characteristics
Likt indexed by k, and demographic characteristics Dijt indexed by j, for each borrower i.
These characteristics can potentially vary over time, although in practice most of the ones
we measure are constant over time. The initial interest rate on the mortgage, ri is also
included as an explanatory variable in the model.3 The coe¢ cient on initial interest rate
and on loan term (in the set of loan characteristics L) have a subscript r to indicate that
separate coe¢ cients are allowed here for xed and variable rate mortgages; loan term and
initial interest rate do not necessarily relate to risk in the same way for xed and variable rate
mortgages. In the subsequent sections, we augment this basic specication to include time-
series variation in regulatory thresholds, interacted with dummies to capture cross-sectional
3The model is estimated at the annual frequency t; to eliminate monthly seasonal variation, we de-mean
all left- and right-hand side variables at the monthly frequency and add back the annual mean. This change
is innocuous, having little impact on our results.
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variation in the expected impacts of these changes.
The model allows for an unobserved macroeconomic shock Zr;t 1 to impact these deter-
minants multiplicatively, and we allow a separate set of shocks to a¤ect xed and variable
rate mortgages. While in practice the time-series of estimated xed and variable rate shocks
appear quite similar, this exibility is important, since the macroeconomic shocks that drive
delinquency may be di¤erent if mortgage rates adjust to interest rate movements (Campbell
and Cocco 2012).
Given the presence of macroeconomic shocks, the estimated coe¢ cients on the branch and
cohort xed e¤ects, and loan and demographic characteristics show the extent to which these
factors alter the propensity for a loan to default as macro conditions vary. To x ideas,
consider a high estimated value of a particular cohort e¤ect  this would indicate a high
propensity of loans in that cohort to default when times are bad, i.e., when Zr;t 1 is high.
The choice of Zr;t 1 rather than Zrt as the macroeconomic shock inuencing delinquency
at time t captures the fact that 90-day delinquencies are not realized contemporaneously
with deteriorations in macroeconomic circumstances. Rather, we expect to see delinquencies
materialize some period of time after negative macroeconomic shocks, as delinquencies result
from borrower-level cash-ow problems, which likely occur with a lag.
We employ a two-stage estimation procedure, in which the rst stage comprises T cross-
sectional regressions estimated across all loans outstanding, and not yet delinquent, in each
year t 2 T . In the second stage, we employ the classical minimum distance estimator
(see, for example, Wooldridge 2002) to extract estimates of Zt and the static parameters of
the model. As a check on our procedure, we conrm that two-stage estimation produces
estimates that are very close to those obtained via single-step estimation using non-linear
least squares. To obtain standard errors for the second stage estimates we use a cross-
sectional correlation consistent bootstrap procedure, in which we draw a set of time periods
equal to the total number of years (15) in our data t1b ; :::; t
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b 2 T with replacement, and
assemble a simulated dataset for each bootstrap draw b. We then re-run the second stage
regressions for b = 500 draws.
Figure 5 plots a weighted average of the estimated macroeconomic shocks for xed and
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variable rate mortgages, Zrt. The gure also shows two di¤erent measures of macroeconomic
conditions: real GDP growth, and the average real rate of growth in corporate sales, rm
xed assets, and rm net worth estimated from the population of Indian rms available
in the Prowess database.4 The gure, in which all series are standardized for ease of
comparison, shows that estimated Zrt seem closely, although not perfectly related to these
other measures. All three measures indicate that 2002 and 2003 were periods of particularly
poor macroeconomic conditions, with a complete recovery in the Indian macro environment
only by 2005. Thus our model explains the spike in delinquencies in 200203, illustrated in
Figure 4, by macroeconomic shocks occurring at that time.
3.1 Household- and Loan-Level Determinants of Delinquency
The demographic variables that we employ include the borrowers gender, marital status,
number of dependents, and dummies for age (up to age 35, 36-45, and 46 and above), for
education (high-school measured by higher-secondary certicate or HSC, college, postgradu-
ate, and missing), for a nance-related educational qualication, and for a repeat borrower.
The loan characteristics include the loan-cost ratio, log loan amount, log loan-income ratio,
and dummies for whether the loan was paid by salary deduction or via a special scheme
with the employer, as well as dummies for special loan characteristics (tranched issuances
and renancings), specic loan purposes (home extension or improvement), and mortgage
contract terms (loan maturities 6-10 years, 11-15 years, or 16 years and above, estimated
separately for xed and variable-rate mortgages). We also include a dummy for mortgages
observed in the rst year of issuance.
To control for house-price movements, we also include in the set of loan characteristics
regional house-price appreciation up to time t from the time of the disbursal of the loan.
For variable-rate loans only, we control for the change in the 1-year Indian government bond
yield since issuance. Finally, we include a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if
4This database comprises the population of listed and large unlisted Indian rms, and is considered to
be the main source of information on Indian corporates (see, for example, von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee,
and Visaria, 2012).
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a loan is disbursed from a branch in the 12 months prior to a state election, to capture
the possibility (documented by Cole 2009 for Indian agricultural lending) that in election
seasons there may be pressure to disburse politically expedient loans, which have a higher
propensity to be delinquent.
Table 4 reports the estimated coe¢ cients on these demographic and loan characteristics.
These are typically statistically signicant, with the theoretically expected sign. Older
male and repeat borrowers have a higher delinquency rate, while more educated borrowers
have a lower rate. Interestingly, however, a nance-related educational qualication slightly
increases the delinquency rate, possibly because nancial-sector income is more volatile.
Mortgages with higher loan-income and loan-cost ratios are more likely to become delinquent,
but the absolute size of a loan lowers the delinquency rate. Loans paid through salary
deduction or administered through employers have lower delinquency rates. Loans with
long maturity have higher delinquency rates, as do xed-rate mortgages. The latter result
may be related to the generally downward trend of interest rates during this period in India,
although our variable that measures the change in the Indian one-year government bond rate
since issuance (for variable-rate mortgages only) does not enter the regression signicantly.
Regional house prices have a powerful e¤ect on delinquency, as one would expect, but we do
not nd any evidence that loans disbursed in election seasons are unusually likely to become
delinquent.
All of these variables are signicant in the presence of the initial mortgage interest rate,
which however enters the regression signicantly as well. This implies that the mortgage
lender does have information relevant for predicting delinquency, and uses it to set rates, but
does not fully adjust the initial mortgage rate to the probability of delinquency conditional
on observable borrower and loan characteristics.
3.2 Regulation and Delinquencies: PSL Norms
In order to assess the impact of regulation on delinquencies, we next include regulatory
variables in our regression along with all the demographic and loan characteristics except
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the log loan amount (which would be collinear with our regulatory variables). Table 5 shows
the results, excluding the coe¢ cients on demographic and loan characteristics which are very
similar to those reported in Table 4. The top part of Table 5 reports variables related to
PSL norms, while the bottom part looks at the e¤ect of risk weights on mortgages with high
loan-cost ratios.
Table 5 includes three specications, labeled A, B, and C. Specication A includes a
piecewise linear function of log loan size, with a kink at the PSL threshold. In addition,
the slope below the PSL threshold is interacted with the unqualied lending share, which as
previously discussed we use as a proxy for the intensity of regulatory pressure to originate
small loans. When the unqualied lending share is high, house prices are high relative to
the PSL threshold and the mortgage lender is particularly keen to originate PSL-qualifying
loans since these are in short supply. Consistent with this view, we nd that delinquency
rates increase as loan sizes get smaller, but the e¤ect is statistically signicant only below the
PSL threshold, and the slope of this relationship gets steeper when the unqualied lending
share is high.
Figure 6 summarizes this result graphically. The top panel of the gure shows the
variation in the delinquency rate associated with log loan size relative to the PSL threshold.
Above the threshold, there is almost no e¤ect, but the smallest loans have a delinquency
rate that is 1.5% higher when the unqualied lending share is one standard deviation below
its mean, and over 2% higher when the unqualied lending share is one standard deviation
above its mean.
This nding raises interesting questions about the behavior of our mortgage lender. If
the lender reacts to PSL policy by lowering interest rates equally on all qualifying mortgages,
then as we have discussed earlier, higher-income borrowers have an incentive to increase their
downpayments so that their loan size shrinks to a qualifying level. To the extent that these
borrowers are safer, their reaction blurs the discontinuity in delinquency rates (conditional
on interest rates) that we would otherwise observe at the PSL threshold. But then it should
be protable for the lender to lower interest rates further on mortgages just below the PSL
threshold, and raise them for micro loans far below the threshold, eliminating the slope that
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we illustrate in Figure 6. The fact that we do not see this may reect limited capacity
of the lender to ne-tune mortgage rates in response to variables that predict delinquency
(such as the educational variables reported in Table 4), or political pressures or institutional
preferences favoring micro loans.
Specication B considers geographic variation in delinquency rates and PSL-qualied
lending. This specication retains the variables from specication A, which continue to
have very similar estimated coe¢ cients, but adds three new variables. The rst is the
unqualied lending share in the sub-branch originating each loan. This has a negative coef-
cient, consistent with the view that loans originated in wealthy areas (where PSL-qualifying
loans are relatively scarce) are safer than loans originated in poor areas. Then, the sub-
branch-specic unqualied lending share is demeaned in each cohort (to avoid contaminating
the interpretation of the coe¢ cients we have discussed so far), and interacted with both loan
size below the PSL threshold, and the interaction of this variable with the overall unqual-
ied lending share (creating a triple interaction). Both these interactions are statistically
signicant and negative. This tells us, rst, that the spread in delinquency rates between
poor and wealthy areas is narrower for smaller loans, and second, that the narrowing of the
delinquency spread for small loans is stronger when there is more intense regulatory pressure
to originate small loans. Putting these e¤ects together, the mortgage lender appears to
respond to regulatory incentives to originate small loans by increasing risky small lending
particularly in sub-branches that do relatively little PSL-qualifying lending. Such a reaction
may be rational given the overall lower risk of loans originated in these sub-branches.
The bottom panel of Figure 6 illustrates this result by plotting the spread in delinquency
rates between a sub-branch with an unqualied lending share one standard deviation below
the mean, and a sub-branch with an unqualied lending share one standard deviation above
the mean. The spread narrows as loan size declines, but this narrowing is negligible when the
overall unqualied lending share is one standard deviation below the mean, and substantial
(about 50 basis points for loans two standard deviations smaller than the PSL threshold)
when the overall unqualied lending share is one standard deviation above the mean.
The nal specication in Table 5, specication C, shows that the time-series and cross-
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sectional e¤ects on mortgage risk, discussed above, can be summarized using a single variable
interacted with loan size, the sub-branch-specic unqualied lending share. In other words,
the pattern of mortgage risk in our data is similar to what we would expect if each sub-
branch of the mortgage lender were an independent entity responding to regulatory pressure
summarized by the sub-branchs own unqualied lending share.
The patterns in mortgage risk shown in Table 5 suggest that the mortgage lender responds
to regulatory pressure by increasing the volume of PSL-qualifying loans. Table 6 reports
some more direct evidence that this is the case. Panel A of the table looks at four changes
in the PSL threshold, and records growth rates of mortgage lending within narrow bands of
loan size (either 1% or 2.5%) around the old and new thresholds. Since the old threshold
becomes irrelevant for PSL-qualifying lending, while the new threshold becomes relevant, one
would expect regulatory pressure to increase lending immediately above the old threshold
relative to lending immediately below, and to increase lending immediately below the new
threshold relative to lending immediately above. Panel A of Table 6 reports the average
of lending growth above minus below the old threshold, and below minus above the new
threshold, within one year of the threshold change. The estimated e¤ect is large, at 41%
for a 1% band and 30% for a 2.5% band, although it also has a large standard error.
Panel B of Table 6 looks at geographical variation in the volume of PSL-qualifying lend-
ing. We estimate a regression predicting the change in log share of sub-branch lending
below last months PSL threshold, using the lagged sub-branch PSL share, a dummy for a
PSL threshold change, and the dummy interacted with the lagged sub-branch PSL share.
An increase in the threshold lowers the propensity to make loans below the old threshold,
and this e¤ect is stronger in sub-branches with low PSL shares, that is in sub-branches in
wealthy areas. The interaction e¤ect has the sign we would expect given the results of Table
5, although it is not statistically signicant.
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3.3 Regulation and Delinquencies: Risk Weights
We also use our regression (1) to examine the e¤ect of changing risk weights for mortgage
loans with high loan-value ratios. The bottom part of Table 5 predicts delinquencies using
a piecewise linear function of the loan-cost ratio, with kinks at 65% and 85%. The slope
in the intermediate range between 65% and 85%, which is most a¤ected by risk weights, is
interacted with the di¤erence in risk weights between loans above and below a 75% loan-
value ratio. As the mortgage provider reports only the loan-cost ratio, which is conceptually
similar but not identical to the loan-value ratio (because legal and administrative fees are
included in cost but not in value), the inection points at loan-cost ratios of 65% and 85%
are equivalent to an assumption that loan-cost ratios above 85% are always above 75 %
loan-value, and conversely for loans below loan-cost ratios of 65%. The distinction between
loan-cost and loan-value ratios eliminates any sharp discontinuity at 75% loan-cost ratio
and once again prevents us from using regression discontinuity analysis.
The results of this exercise are not much a¤ected by the choice of specication A, B, or C.
In all cases the e¤ect of the loan-cost ratio on delinquency is strongest in the intermediate
range. This is consistent with the view that extremely low loan-cost ratios have little impact
on loan risk (since the loan is extremely well collateralized already), while extremely high
loan-cost ratios are unusual loans that are only made in special circumstances to particularly
high-quality borrowers. The interaction e¤ect is negative, implying that high risk weights for
mortgages with high loan-value ratios tend to reduce relative delinquency rates for mortgages
with high loan-cost ratios. However, the interaction e¤ect is not statistically signicant.
Figure 7 illustrates the result graphically for the case of specication A.
Although these ndings are not strong statistically, they are relevant for the suggestion
of Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) that capital requirements against risk-weighted assets
should be countercyclically adjusted. In our Indian data, reductions in the risk weight
on high loan-value mortgages are associated with higher levels of mortgage delinquencies
for mortgages with high loan-cost ratios. This suggests that Kashyap, Rajan, and Steins
policy can inuence the riskiness of mortgage lending.
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4 The Classication of Non-Performing Assets
In this section we examine another regulatory change that took place during our sample
period. On March 31, 2004 for banks, and March 31, 2005 for HFCs, the classication of
non-performing assets(or NPAs) was changed to 90 days past due from the previous time
period of 180 days past due. This regulatory reclassication of 90-day delinquencies, and
its implications for provisioning requirements, may have contributed to the unusually low
90-day delinquency rates reported in Table 3 for more recent loan cohorts. One mechanism
by which this might occur is that the reclassication may have given our mortgage lender
the incentive to more intensively monitor shorter-term delinquencies (say 30 days past due),
and to take earlier action to forestall 90-day delinquency. As described earlier, we do not
take a rm stand on the exact month of delinquency in which there might be a discontinuity,
but rather, track loans before and after the regulatory change, across their time-path of
delinquency.
We therefore evaluate the expected loss given a delinquency before and after the regu-
latory reclassication. This expected loss is the product of the probability of experiencing
a delinquency and the loss given delinquency. Table 7 looks at the rst of these two ele-
ments, computing transition probabilities of loans that hit the 30-day delinquency threshold
to the 90-day delinquency mark, as well as the transition probability of 90-day delinquencies
to the 180-day delinquent mark. The table shows that across the entire sample period,
22.7% (22.8%) of 30-day (90-day) delinquent loans eventually become 90 days (180 days)
delinquent.
As we are unable to publicly identify whether the mortgage provider is a bank or an
HFC, we use the earlier RBI implementation date of 31 March 2004 as the date of the
regulatory change, to cover all possibilities. When we look separately at the pre-April 2004
period for the 30-day delinquencies, the transition probability is 29%, which is almost twice
as high as the post-March 2004 transition probability of 14.9%. The reduction, of 14.1%, is
highly statistically signicant. Clearly, following the change in the denition of NPAs to the
shorter 90-day limit, the mortgage provider substantially reduced this transition probability,
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potentially by exerting e¤ort to pursue borrowers more aggressively. The 90-day to 180-day
transition probability also reduces following the 2004 reclassication, but by a much smaller
2.3%, suggesting that once the loan becomes classied as an NPA, there are relatively fewer
incentives to take action. Another possibility, of course, is that the loans reaching the 90-day
delinquency mark are simply very di¢ cult to collect on despite the lenders exertions.5
To better understand the magnitude of loss given delinquency, we acquire a sample
of 10,000 loans from the total population of loans. As our focus is to understand the
determinants of mortgage risk, we randomly sample 2,500 xed-rate and 2,500 variable-
rate loans from the set of 90-day delinquent loans, and a further 2,500 xed-rate and 2,500
variable-rate loans from the set of loans that do not experience a 90-day delinquency. In
each sub-sample of 2,500 loans, we further ensure that we sample an equal number (1,250)
from the early period in the data (disbursed prior to January 2000) and the later period
(disbursed between January 2000 and December 2004). We have veried that this 10,000
loan sample has statistically indistinguishable characteristics from the population of loans
from which we draw. For each one of these 10,000 loans, we are able to track the full payment
history over time, as well as deviations from contracted repayments. We can compute the
latter as we are also given the equated monthly installment (EMI) for each of these loans in
each month, which is the expected monthly principal repayment plus interest amount. We
ensure that we weight any measures constructed using this sample, so that they are reective
of the larger population of loans from which the sampling occurred.
For each loan in the sample, we construct a measure of losses accrued over time. To do
so, we accumulate payments and EMI over time, and compute the cumulative installment
decit(or CID) as Min(0, cumulative payment-cumulative EMI)/EMI. This measure takes
the value of zero if monthly payments exceed or equal the EMI, and is negative otherwise,
indicating when borrowers are in arrears. The cumulation ensures that if overpayments are
5It is also worth noting here that the 2002 implementation of SARFAESI, described above, allowed for
easier restructuring and repossession of delinquent loans. However the small change in the 90-180 day
transition probability despite this regulatory change mirrors the insignicant post-SARFAESI change in the
CID debt collection rate that we dene and analyze below. These results suggest that at least for housing
loans, this particular regulatory change may not have had very large e¤ects.
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made to redress arrears, these are allowed to push the measure towards zero. The division
by EMI puts the cumulative installment decit into units of required monthly payments.
Figure 8 plots the CID measure around 30-day delinquencies, before and after the regu-
latory change to the denition of NPAs. The measure is cross-sectionally demeaned by both
cohort-year and calendar-year, to ensure that we are not picking up cohort or macroeconomic
e¤ects. In both panels of Figure 8, date 0 is the rst date that the loan is declared 30-days
delinquent (values below 1 are possible because of the cross-sectional demeaning). The top
panel shows that prior to the change in the regulatory denition of NPAs, loans declared
30-days delinquent on average inicted a cost on the mortgage provider of roughly 1.1 EMIs
after a year. Post-March 2004, there is a substantial recovery in this number, with such
30-delinquent loans roughly 0.3 EMIs delinquent 12 months later. The bottom panel of the
gure shows that this change in the behavior of the CID after the regulatory redenition of
NPAs is highly statistically signicant.
We undertake this analysis more formally by estimating how changes in the CID vary
following a 30-day delinquency, but prior to hitting the 90-day threshold, both before and
after the regulatory redenition of the NPA period. To do so, we estimate expected debt
collection rates  changes in the CID as a polynomial function of the level of the CID
prior to the 90-day delinquency mark (i.e., a CID level of  3), allowing for a jump in the
rate at the 90-day delinquency mark, and modelled as a linear function of the CID beyond
the 90-day delinquency mark. As before, we include time- and cohort-specic xed e¤ects
during estimation to ensure that we are not merely picking up some of the broader changes
detected earlier in the regulatory and macroeconomic environment.
Figure 9 shows how the estimated debt collection rate varies before and after the 90-
day delinquency threshold, before and after the regulatory redenition of NPAs in March
2004. The gure clearly reveals that following the regulatory redenition of NPAs, the debt
collection rate prior to hitting the 90-day mark increased substantially relative to the pre-
regulatory change period, with a signicant discontinuity at the 90-day threshold, where the
debt collection rate falls sharply.6 We also consider whether the introduction of SARFAESI
6The increase in the debt collection rate prior to the 90-day delinquency mark, and the discontinuity
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had any signicant impacts on the ability to collect on debts, and nd that while there is
a mild increase in the pre-90 day debt collection rate, it is dwarfed by the change following
the NPA redenition (moreover, the small discontinuity evident in this line at the 90-day
mark is statistically insignicant).
While these changes to debt collection rates are clearly evident in the data, one potential
worry is that the redenition of NPAs from 180 to 90 days simply shifted the inevitable
recovery of cash from delinquent borrowers by the 90-day di¤erence between these two dates.
In other words, perhaps the change merely provided a time-value improvement in the net
cash ows of the mortgage provider, but no more substantial impacts.
To address this question, Figure 10 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the change in the CID (time- and cohort-demeaned) in the year following the rst 30 day
delinquency. This CDF is plotted for three time periods, namely, January 1995 to June
2002, when SARFAESI was rst implemented; July 2002 to March 2004, the date of the
redenition of NPAs; and post-April 2004 until the end of the sample period in 2010. We
plot the gure on a log scale to focus attention on the very worst cases (i.e., those loans with
the greatest degradation in CID over the year following the date of rst 30-day delinquency),
as these loans are the most likely candidates for a complete write-o¤.
The gure shows that the post-NPA redenition CDF rst-order stochastically dominates
both the pre- and post-SARFAESI CDFs, showing a substantial reduction in the incidence
of high degradation in the CID. While SARFAESI appears to have had some benecial
impacts for the very worst cases, this is dwarfed by the large impact of the NPA redenition.
These substantial impacts on eventual bad debts of this regulatory redenition are striking,
as it appears that there are important real benets to incentivizing mortgage providers to
detect and take early action on delinquencies.
Finally, in Figure 11 we document some evidence that the change in the regulatory
classication of NPAs a¤ected mortgage origination as well as mortgage monitoring practices.
at that mark are both economically and statistically signicant. The online empirical appendix plots
the di¤erence between the pre- and post- NPA redenition debt collection rates with associated bootstrap
condence intervals.
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This gure reports the same curve as in Figure 10, separately for loans originated in a
six-month window before the NPA reclassication and in a six-month window after the
reclassication. The left tail of the distribution is noticeably thicker for loans originated
before the reclassication, even though both cohorts of loans are experiencing delinquency
after the reclassication and hence are subject to post-reclassication monitoring by the
mortgage lender. This implies that the reclassication induced the mortgage lender to
tighten mortgage origination standards slightly as well as to monitor mortgages more closely.
In summary, a simple change in the regulatory denition of NPAs appears to have signif-
icantly moderated mortgage delinquencies. The impacts are visible in both the probability
of delinquency and the eventual loss given delinquency, and they are somewhat stronger for
mortgages originated after the NPA reclassication.
5 Conclusion
The Indian regulatory and macroeconomic environment has changed dramatically during
the last two decades. A fast-developing housing nance system has coped with signicant
variation in default rates and interest rates, and regulatory changes in the incentives to
originate mortgages in general, and small loans in particular. In this paper we have explored
the e¤ects of such regulatory changes on mortgage risk.
Our empirical strategy links time variation in regulation with expected cross-sectional
impacts on di¤erent types of mortgages. We view this approach as an appealing alterna-
tive to regression discontinuity analysis for studies analyzing the impacts of regulation on
market outcomes, especially in situations where discontinuities are hard to identify, or in
environments where the discontinuities at thresholds are blurred by the responses of market
participants.
We have presented evidence that regulatory subsidies for low-cost housing distorted the
e¢ cient markets relationship between interest rates and subsequent delinquencies, and that
changes to the denition of non-performing assets impacted behavior in response to early
evidence of payment delinquencies. While it is di¢ cult to generalize ndings from one coun-
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try, the e¤ect of the regulatory redenition of NPAs does suggest that even seemingly minor
regulatory changes can have important impacts on mortgage monitoring and origination
practices, and hence on mortgage risk.
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A: Cross-Sectional Means
Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed
1995 15.22% 15.00% 13.96 11.66 0.58 0.54 3.73 3.52 1.70% 2.27%
1996 16.39% 16.14% 13.21 10.89 0.57 0.54 3.69 3.45 1.98% 2.56%
1997 15.54% 15.25% 13.18 10.38 0.58 0.55 3.69 3.38 1.76% 2.79%
1998 14.45% 14.09% 13.08 10.06 0.61 0.57 3.67 3.28 1.84% 3.12%
1999 13.58% 13.39% 12.88 10.63 0.64 0.61 3.62 3.31 1.78% 4.38%
2000 12.58% 12.83% 12.95 10.55 0.67 0.67 3.58 3.20 2.13% 4.58%
2001 11.78% 11.76% 12.72 10.23 0.68 0.64 3.56 3.23 2.16% 5.27%
2002 10.92% 10.82% 13.15 10.03 0.70 0.64 3.49 3.21 2.53% 4.63%
2003 10.68% 9.41% 12.88 12.76 0.72 0.65 3.45 3.54 2.36% 2.20%
2004 10.82% 8.13% 14.07 15.13 0.73 0.71 3.65 3.75 2.18% 0.91%
2005 10.42% 8.83% 15.16 15.17 0.74 0.69 3.75 3.72 1.75% 1.26%
2006 10.85% 10.45% 15.23 15.59 0.73 0.70 3.74 3.69 1.53% 1.12%
2007 11.03% 12.26% 15.03 14.68 0.73 0.68 3.75 3.58 1.18% 1.43%
2008 10.79% 15.38 0.72 3.78
2009 9.51% 14.31 0.71 3.72
2010 8.39% 15.59 0.73 3.84
B: Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations
Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed
1995 0.94% 1.13% 2.51 4.24 0.18 0.20 0.47 0.71
1996 1.28% 1.53% 2.73 4.26 0.18 0.20 0.49 0.74
1997 0.84% 1.22% 2.72 4.49 0.18 0.20 0.51 0.83
1998 0.71% 1.09% 2.81 4.69 0.18 0.20 0.51 0.86
1999 0.51% 0.77% 3.00 4.52 0.18 0.19 0.52 0.80
2000 1.21% 0.85% 3.61 4.57 0.18 0.19 0.57 0.85
2001 1.06% 0.97% 3.97 4.56 0.18 0.24 0.61 0.83
2002 1.46% 0.92% 4.43 4.63 0.19 0.24 0.70 0.81
2003 2.08% 0.89% 4.85 4.77 0.19 0.26 0.78 0.67
2004 2.04% 0.60% 4.97 4.55 0.18 0.21 0.72 0.59
2005 1.73% 0.48% 4.92 4.52 0.18 0.22 0.68 0.60
2006 1.24% 0.76% 4.95 4.48 0.18 0.22 0.70 0.63
2007 0.67% 1.00% 4.41 4.78 0.18 0.23 0.69 0.71
2008 0.59% 4.57 0.18 0.70
2009 0.77% 5.00 0.18 0.72
2010 0.37% 4.55 0.17 0.64
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Loan Characteristics by Disbursal Year
Loan Term (Years)Initial Interest Rate Loan-Cost Ratio Loan-Income Ratio
Loan Term (Years)Initial Interest Rate Loan-Cost Ratio Loan-Income Ratio Cohort 90-Day Delinquency Rate 
This table provides yearly means (Panel A) and standard deviations (Panel B) of important characteristics for the more than 1.2 million mortgage loans 
disbursed by the lender. Cohort delinquency rates are computed as the annual probability that an outstanding and not-yet-90-day-delinquent loan 
experiences a 90 day delinquency. This probability is computed separately for each disbursal-year cohort and calendar year. The delinquency rate 
below represents the time-series average across calendar year estimates for each disbursal-year cohort. Statistics for fixed rate disbursals are removed 
for the years 2008 through 2010, as fixed rate disbursals account for well under one percent of disbursals (by count or value) in each of these years. 
Similarly, cohort 90-day delinquency rate is omitted for loans disbursed after 2007 as these loans have not been around long enough to reliably 
estimate a delinquency rate.
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Coefficient S.E.
Borrower Characteristics:
Log Number of Dependents -0.047 0.052
Male Borrower 0.236 0.024
Married Borrower 0.059 0.033
Borrower age 36-45 0.095 0.012
Age 46 and up 0.240 0.043
Dummy: Repeat Borrower 0.397 0.110
Dummy: Qualification Missing or Unidentified -0.142 0.055
Dummy: HSC Equivalent -0.480 0.067
Dummy: BA Equivalent -0.741 0.093
Dummy: Post-Grad Equivalent -1.123 0.091
Dummy: Finance-Related Qualification 0.189 0.029
Loan Characteristics:
Initial Interest Rate (Variable Rate Mortgages) 0.449 0.041
Initial Interest Rate (Fixed Rate Mortgages) 0.321 0.038
Change in One-Year Government Bond Yield Since Disbursal (Variable 
Rate Mortgages Only)
0.078 0.041
Regional Log Home Price Appreciation Since Disbursal -0.952 0.248
Log Loan to Income Ratio (winsorized at 1st, 99th) 0.792 0.065
Log Loan Amount -0.835 0.109
Loan to Cost Ratio 2.958 0.127
Dummy: Usually Paid by Salary Deduction -1.889 0.102
Dummy: Loan administered through employers -0.268 0.054
Dummy: Loan is a Refinancing 0.448 0.098
Dummy: Loan is for a Home Extension -0.160 0.043
Dummy: Loan is for a Home Improvement 0.239 0.076
Dummy: Tranched Issuance -0.524 0.124
Dummy: 6 to 10 Year Loan (Variable Rate Mortgages) 0.191 0.081
Dummy: 11 to 15 Year Loan (Variable Rate Mortgages) 0.653 0.115
Dummy: 16 Year+ Loan (Variable Rate Mortgages) 1.496 0.178
Dummy: 6 to 10 Year Loan (Fixed Rate Mortgages) 0.754 0.117
Dummy: 11 to 15 Year Loan (Fixed Rate Mortgages) 1.228 0.142
Dummy: 16 Year+ Loan (Fixed Rate Mortgages) 0.646 0.116
Dummy: Fixed Rate Mortgage 1.790 0.649
Dummy: Year of Loan Issuance -2.531 0.133
Dummy: Disbursed Within 12 Months of State Election -0.010 0.047
This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors from estimates of equation (1) in the paper. The estimation 
takes place in two stages. First, cross-sectional estimates are produced for each year. Coefficients below are produced 
from the cross-sectional estimates by classical minimum distance (See Wooldridge 2002, p442-446). Excluded from 
coefficients below are cohort, branch, and monthly fixed effects, and separate macroeconomic scaling effects Zt for 
fixed and variable rate mortgages. Standard errors are given in italics to the right of coefficients, and are computed by 
bootstrapping calendar years. Coefficients that are statistically significant at 5% and 10% two-sided level are in bold 
and italicized type respectively. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for readability.
Table 4: 90 Day Delinquency Model
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Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Loan Size Based (PSL) Regulation:
Slope Above PSL Threshold -0.105 0.106 0.074 0.086 0.059 0.087
Slope Below PSL Threshold -0.889 0.084 -0.853 0.080 -0.794 0.098
Unqualified Lending Share X Slope Below PSL Threshold -0.145 0.044 -0.136 0.047
Sub-Branch Unqualified Lending Share -0.322 0.027 -0.431 0.037
Cohort De-meaned Sub-Branch Unqualified Lending Share X Slope Below 
PSL Threshold
-0.063 0.022
Cohort De-meaned Sub-Branch Unqualified Lending Share X Unqualified 
Lending Share X Slope Below PSL Threshold
-0.060 0.018
Sub-Branch Unqualified Lending Share X Slope Below PSL Threshold -0.076 0.025
Loan Leverage Based Regulation:
Loan-Cost Ratio, Slope Below 65% 3.080 0.271 2.929 0.247 2.935 0.244
Loan-Cost Ratio, Slope Between 65 and 85% 3.556 0.384 3.545 0.361 3.581 0.368
Difference in Cohort Risk Weights on Loans Above vs Below 75% LTV X 
Slope Between Loan-Cost Ratio of 65 and 85%
-1.244 1.533 -1.415 1.607 -1.720 1.682
Loan-Cost Ratio, Slope Above 85% -2.195 0.717 -1.986 0.680 -1.968 0.674
Borrower Characteristics
Loan Characteristics
Cohort Fixed Effects
Annual Macroeconomic Effects (Separate for Fixed, Variable Rate Mortgages)
21 Branch Dummies
R-squared
Yes
Yes
Yes
This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors from estimates of equation (1) in the paper, estimated as in Table 4. Unqualified 
lending share is the share of loan disbursals (by value) made over the past year which are associated with loans larger than the latest PSL 
threshold. Sub-branch unqualified lending share is the same statistic, computed at the sub-branch level, and cohort de-meaned sub-branch 
unqualified lending share is the cross-sectionally de-meaned version of the sub-branch level statistic. All "unqualified lending share" 
variables are scaled to a mean of zero and variance of one for ease of interpretation. Coefficients that are statistically significant at a 5% or 
10% two-sided level are in bold and italicized type respectively. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for readability. R-
squared is calculated as the average of the variance of fitted values to variance of dependent variable in each cross-section.
[A] [B] [C]
0.0156 0.0157 0.0157
Table 5: Regulatory Impact on 90 Day Delinquency
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
YesYes
Yes
Yes
Yes
YesYes
Yes
35
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
α 41% 25% 30% 20%
Constant -0.052 0.010
De-meaned Lagged Sub-Branch PSL Share 0.017 0.034 -0.068 0.044
Dummy: PSL Threshold Changes -0.044 0.017 -0.051 0.020
De-meaned Lagged Sub-Branch PSL Share X 
PSL Threshold Changes
0.052 0.046 0.054 0.048
[w/o Sub-Branch FE] [with Sub-Branch FE]
Table 6: Lending Volume Responses to PSL Regulation
In panel A, the estimated value, α, is: [(growth above minus growth below old threshold)+(growth below 
minus growth above new threshold)]/2. Growth is measured by first drawing cutoffs above and below the 
thresholds representing either 1% or 2.5% of aggregate lending activity in the year prior to PSL threshold 
changes. We then look at growth in the share of loans disbursed within those ranges in the year following 
the PSL threshold change. In panel B, the sub-branch lending share below the past month's PSL threshold is 
predicted with lagged PSL lending share and a dummy to indicate increases in the PSL threshold, which is 
also interacted with lagged PSL lending share. Increases in the PSL threshold are hypothesized to result in 
reductions in lending below the old (lower) PSL thresholds, and these reductions are expected to be even 
larger for sub-branches with lower PSL lending shares. Sub-branch observations are weighted 
proportionally to their share of the number of loans disbursed in the surrounding 12 month period. Standard 
errors in italics are based on bootstraps of the four events where PSL thresholds change in panel A, and of 
years in panel B.
using 1% cutoffs using 2.5% cutoffs
A: Difference in Lending Growth Below and Above PSL Thresholds at Threshold Changes
Dependent Variable: Change in Log Share of Sub-Branch Lending Below Last Month's PSL Threshold
B: Cross-sectional Responsiveness of PSL Lending Growth to PSL Threshold Changes
Month Relative Value SE Value SE
For Initial Delinquencies Occurring:
All Months (Jan 1996-Dec 2010) 22.7% 0.3% 22.8% 0.4%
Jan 1996-Mar 2004 (180day NPA Regime) 29.0% 0.5% 23.9% 0.6%
April 2004-Dec 2010 (90d NPA Regime) 14.9% 0.4% 21.6% 0.6%
Difference Around April 2004 -14.1% 0.7% -2.3% 0.9%
Table 7: Probability of Transition to Later Stage of Delinquency
This table presents the probability that initial 30 and 90 day mortgage delinquencies become 90 and 180 day mortgage 
delinquencies respectively within six months following the initial delinquency. This transition probability is first computed 
for all loans with initial delinquencies in a given month, and the probabilities shown below are the time-series average of 
these monthly cross-sectional estimates, where the average is taken over the indicated time periods. Standard errors are given 
in italics and constructed by bootstrapping from the population of monthly cross-sectional estimates from each time period 
indicated. All coefficients are highly statistically significant.
Probability of 30 day Delinquency 
Transitioning to 90 day Delinquency
Probability of 90 day Delinquency 
Transitioning to 180 day Delinquency
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